The Latest Exciting Research from Canterbury Earthquakes 2015

Thanks again to those who submitted titles.

[PDF] For the people, by the minister: Ministerial interventions in subnational, elected bodies and a principled approach to their future application, L Hardcastle – 2015

… In 2012, Christchurch City Council requested a Crown observer to assist with post-earthquake … 59 Ben Heather “Council observer to meet councillors” The Press (online ed, Christchurch, 30 January … 60 Nick Smith “Crown Observer to assist ChCh City Council” (press release, 27 …

Why do the design stage elemental cost plan and final tender sum differ in New Zealand?, JK Adafin, JOB Rotimi, SJ Wilkinson, GD Holt – Journal of Financial Management of …, 2015

… For example, the Christchurch City Council [CCC] (2011) explained that a contingency sum of NZ$192 million was added as a lump sum to the base estimates submitted as the expected or most likely cost for the Christchurch (a New Zealand city) infrastructure rebuild. …

Quake City, S Mazer – Performance Research, 2015

… Christchurch, New Zealand. Quake City – Christchurch’s Earthquake Attraction was built by the Canterbury Museum. … Christchurch, New Zealand. Quake City – Christchurch’s Earthquake Attraction was built by the Canterbury Museum. …

[DOC] Vote Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, My Appropriations – Policy

… 2,684, 2,684. Christchurch Convention Centre – Operating This category is limited to the development of the Christchurch Convention Centre. -, 3,223, 3,223. Earthquake Memorial – Operating This category is limited to the development of the Canterbury Earthquake Memorial. …

[PDF] Resourcing the Canterbury Rebuild, AY Chang-Richards, S Wilkinson, E Seville… – 2015

… of New Zealand (BRANZ), the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and the Earthquake Commission (EQC). The research team would like to thank Tze-Man Amanda … in Christchurch. Page 7. 1 | Page 1. Introduction This study examines: … 

Probabilistic assessment of increased flooding vulnerability in Christchurch city after the Canterbury 2010-2011 Earthquake Sequence, New Zealand, F Cavalieri, P Franchin, SY Ko, S Giovinazzi, DE Hart – 2015

Major earthquakes can extensively transform the above and below ground natural and built environments of cities, leading to decreased drainage system capacity and, ultimately, to Increased Flooding Vulnerability (IFV). This has been the case for Christchurch city in New …

Interim Housing Provision Following Earthquake Disaster, R Potangaroa – 2015

… actual times (rather than the planned ones) allowed for earthquake disaster responses. For example, the 22 Feb 2011 Christchurch Earthquake based on a response time of around 3 months would suggest the following timeline: …  

Towards integrated person-centred healthcare–the Canterbury journey, C Gullery, G Hamilton – Future Hospital Journal, 2015

… Oughton D. Ellis S. Wakelin B. Rubin C. McLean I. , Oughton D, Ellis S, Wakelin B, Rubin C. Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management response to the 22 February Christchurch earthquake. Wellington: Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2012. …

Natural disasters and dialysis care in the Asia‐Pacific, NA Gray, M Wolley, A Liew, M Nakayama – Nephrology, 2015

… 12-16 , the Tangshan earthquake in 1976 17 , and the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 18 . … is common. Following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, all 42 haemodialysis patients in the city were transferred to other regions 18 . After the Great Tohoku earthquake, 10,906 …

Assisting Children Caught in Disasters: Resources and Suggestions for Practitioners, J Szente – Early Childhood Education Journal

… 1002. Johnson, VA, & Ronan, KR (2014). Classroom responses of New Zealand school teachers following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Natural Hazards, 72, 1075–1092.CrossRef. Karairmak, O., & Aydin, G. (2008). Reducing …  

Defence: Striking the right balance, G Brownlee – New Zealand International Review, 2015

… The Defence Force has also been called upon to respond to natural and environmental dis- asters in New Zealand like the Christchurch Earthquake, the grounding of the MV Rena and subsequent oil spill off the coast of Tauranga and numerous calamities in the Pacific ranging …

[PDF] Review: Animals in Emergencies: Learning from the Christchurch Earthquakes by Annie Potts and Donelle Gadenne, Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury …, M Bekoff – Animal Studies Journal, 2015

… The second part of the book titled ‘Animal Earthquake Stories’ focuses on stories of survival and love and loss. … testament to the bravery and resilience of the animals and people of Christchurch and its environs, and a tribute to those who protected, sheltered and cared for the …

Urbanisation and earthquake disturbance influence microbial nutrient limitation in streams, ER Moffett, KS Simon, JS Harding – Freshwater Biology, 2015

… skewed the data. Sites in Christchurch affected by earthquake disturbance were excluded when relating population density to biofilm responses to avoid confounding effects of earthquake disturbance. Data were log-transformed … 

Post-disaster infrastructure restoration: A comparison of events for future planning, C Zorn, AY Shamseldin – International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015

… Also W: Tochigi G: Chiba and Kanagawa prefectures. E, W, G, T, 2011 Christchurch Earthquake [80], Mobile Telecommunications. E, W, T, 2010 Maule Earthquake [20], E: Talca, Constitutión, Talcahuano, Concepción. W: Talcahuano, Concepción. …

Disaster Preparedness for Children and Families: a Critical Review, KR Ronan, E Alisic, B Towers, VA Johnson… – Current Psychiatry Reports, 2015

… Following the Japanese earthquake and tsunami in 2011, an- ecdotal evidence suggests that effective planning and pre- paredness played a key role in … 7 Falling and tripping were the most common causes of injury after the two major 2010–11 Christchurch earthquakes [10]. … 

A surface seismic approach to liquefaction, S Castellaro, R Panzeri, F Mesiti, L Bertello – Soil Dynamics and Earthquake …, 2015

… Please enable JavaScript to use all the features on this page. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering. Volume 77, October 2015, Pages 35–46. … 1. Examples of soil liquefaction observed after the May 20, 2012, M L =5.9 earthquake (epicenter indicated by the yellow dot). … 

Engaging pet owners in disaster risk and preparedness communications: simplifying complex human–animal relations with archetypes, J Trigg, K Thompson, B Smith, P Bennett – Environmental Hazards, 2015

… 83. New Zealand Police. (2012). List of deceased. Retrieved November 5, 2013, from http://www.police.govt.nz/major-events/previous-major-events/christchurch-earthquake/ list-deceased View all references). Importantly, people … 

The No-Nonsense Guide To Earthquake Safety (Enhanced Edition), J Sims – 2015

… destruction. The 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand was recorded as a 6.3 magnitude seismic event. The quake caused between some $30 and $40 billion in damages, and resulted in an estimated 185 deaths. …  

The disaster flood experience: Older people’s poetic voices of resilience, E Miller, L Brockie – Journal of Aging Studies, 2015

… More recently, Heppenstall, Wilkinson, Hanger, Dhanak, and Keeling (2013) qualitatively explored older adults (n = 50) and their informal caregivers (n = 34) experience of emergency evacuation during the 2011 Christchurch (New Zealand) earthquake. …

The impact of the Canterbury earthquakes on prescribing for mental health, B Beaglehole, C Bell, C Frampton, G Hamilton… – Australian and New Zealand …, 2015

… Psychiatrists 2015. Previous Section. References. ↵: Ardagh MW,; Richardson SK,; Robinson V,; et al. . (2012) The initial health-system response to the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, in February, 2011. Lancet 379: 2109–2115. … 

[PDF] Regional Differences and Similarities in the Personality of New Zealanders, LM Greaves, LJ Cowie, G Fraser, E Muriwai, Y Huang… – New Zealand Journal of …, 2015

… Lara M. Greaves, Lucy J. Cowie, Gloria Fraser, Emerald Muriwai, Yanshu Huang, Petar Milojev, Danny Osborne, Chris G. Sibley University of Auckland, Auckland Marco Zdrenka University of Canterbury, Christchurch Joseph Bulbulia, Marc S. Wilson, James H. Liu, Andrew … 

Thinking ahead: design-directed research in a city which experienced fifty years of sea level change overnight, N Copley, J Bowring, M Abbott – Journal of Landscape Architecture, 2015

… 12 June 2015. Figure 1 The residential red zone located within the urban context of Christchurch city (based on imagery from the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority). … context of Christchurch city (based on imagery from the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority). …

Capacity gaps in post disaster construction & demolition waste management, G Karunasena, D Amaratunga, D Thomson… – Engineering, Construction …, 2015

… considered to be a grave consequence of disasters (USEPA, 1995; 2008; FEMA, 2007). Shibata et al (2012) highlighted that the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami,which … kilogramswhich is equivalent to 14 years of waste generation. The Haiti earthquake in 2010, …

[PDF] New Zealand: The Christchurch Earthquake/Heritage at Risk, M O’Keeffe, I Lochhead, IN Zealand – Heritage at Risk, 2015

Christchurch is the largest city in New Zealand’s South Island. The city was founded in 1848 by British settlers. It is built on a wide alluvial plain, beside two rivers. Christchurch is noted for its architectural heritage, including a large stock of gothic revival stone buildings dating …

[PDF] New Zealand: The Christchurch Earthquake of February 2011, J May – Heritage at Risk, 2015

The city of Christchurch has been rocked by a major earthquake (magnitude 6.3) on last Tuesday, 22 February 2011, half a year after the 7.1 earthquake of 4 September 2010. Besides the serious casualties, the toll on heritage is to be high. It appears that there is …

2 Pleasures Small and Large, RE Rinehart – Sport and the Social Significance of Pleasure, 2015

… Western capitalistic expectations of shops. It is ‘part shop, part art installation, part joke, and part flight of fancy’. It is a contemporary ‘pleasure’project, meant for an earthquake-traumatized Christchurch. But through it, according to …

Third-Sector Organizations, Population Dynamics, and Changing Vulnerabilities Following the 2011 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, NS Hutton, GA Tobin, LM Whiteford – Papers in Applied Geography, 2015

Communities and individuals rely on third-sector organizations (TSOs) following natural disasters to complement formal government recovery activities by providing targeted support. In this way, TSOs can fulfill important niche roles, but the picture becomes …

Bridging the emergency relief and long-term development gap, S Fitzmaurice – 2015

… provincial and national governments. Similarly, the response to the Christchurch earthquake from 2011 engaged in transitional approaches to allow sufficient time to engage communities and for long-term government planning. …  

[PDF] Resilience and Recovery: Business Behaviour Following the Canterbury Earthquakes, E Seville, JR Stevenson, J Vargo, C Brown…

… Page 7. 7 References CCC. (2011). Christchurch Earthquake Response: Liquefaction. Frequently Asked Questions. Christchurch, NZ. … Lifelines Performance and Management Following the 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, New Zealand: Highlights of Resilience. … 

Building children and young people’s resilience: Lessons from Psychology, R Brown – International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015

… In New Zealand students, farmers and community groups delivered food and water, shovelled silt from roads and gardens and provided social support and even toys after a major earthquake in Christchurch in 2011 ([69], Kenney and Phibbs 2014). … 

Leadership in times of crisis: Dispositional, relational and contextual factors influencing school principals’ actions, C Mutch – International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015

… 6.1. Response. The 7.1 September 4 2010 earthquake was centred 40 km to the west of Christchurch city. It happened at 4.35am on a Saturday morning. In the days and weeks that followed, when regular school was suspended … 

The Environment-Friendly Architecture Come Through Wooden Architecture, F Lembo, FPR Marino – 2nd International Congress on Energy Efficiency and …, 2015

… This new material can be combined with new structural earthquake-resistant moment resistant timber frame with post tensioning and … of Basilicata University and by Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering of University of Cambridge, Christchurch, New Zealand …

[PDF] Social Enterprise in New Zealand: An Overview, SGS GRANT

… As noted elsewhere in this report, redevelopment efforts in Christchurch have provided opportunities for many new social enterprises. … This shortage is not related to the Christchurch earthquakes, but remains a key social challenge for New Zealand. Page 9. 9 … 

[PDF] Land valuation: a key tool for disaster risk management, D Mitchell, M Myers, D Grant – Land Tenure Journal, 2015

… The relative property values across Christchurch were permanently altered by factors such as the geotechnical classification of soils regarding their suitability for building foundations, and the compliance of building structures with earthquake codes (and the resulting ability to … 

[HTML] Youth participation at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, L Cumiskey, T Hoang, S Suzuki, C Pettigrew… – International Journal of …, 2015

… (2) Youth Beyond Disasters, Christchurch, 8013, New Zealand. (3) Water Youth Network, 92000 Nanterre, France. (4) Marine and … Other Japanese-led events included “DRR Gaming,” organized by local high-school students, and “Drama of the Great East Japan Earthquake.”. …

[DOC] Access to Justice for Beneficiaries, K Morton, C Gray, A Heins, S Carswell, AN Zealand

… Community Law Canterbury PO Box 2912, Christchurch 8140 Aotearoa New Zealand. … Grants (including Food Grants, Steps to Freedom and Funeral Grant), Advance Payment of Benefit, Training Incentive Allowance, Accommodation Supplement and earthquake related grants. …  

[PDF] Weed Control Methods in the Transitional City, G Barbour, H Gemuh, J Lochhead – 2015

… Initially a cordon was placed around it which was later removed as the post- earthquake clean up started. This clean-up involved heavy machinery that was brought in from various areas outside of Christchurch. Along with this machinery came various seeds that had …  

[PDF] From Prim to Punk: The Successfully Altered Marketing Image of Christchurch City Post-Disaster, LJ Kenix

… independent artistry. _____ Key words: Tourism, space, media, Christchurch, earthquake, marketing, authenticity, participation. Page 2. … 

[PDF] Rejuvenating Linwood Park through Placemaking, A Wright-Taylor, E Newsome, M Chitondo, K Kienja

… needs and wants first, and acknowledging individual differences within and between communities. In post-earthquake Christchurch, there is ample chance to apply placemaking methods. This project worked with different groups in the Linwood community to identify …

‘Rich’and ‘Poor’Schools Revisited, L Gordon – New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 2015

… Since the Christchurch earthquakes it has grown and prospered, with several new subdivisions and increased commercial activity. … school, which was summarily closed at the end of 2013 and merged with the high school, in what was touted as an earthquake-related measure …

A Sex Disparity Among Earthquake Victims, M Ardagh, S Standring, JM Deely, D Johnston… – Disaster Medicine and Public …

… Open Access; Pay-per-View Access; Subscription Access. Home; >; Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness; >; FirstView Articles; >; A Sex Disparity Among Earthquake VictimsA Sex Disparity Among Earthquake Victims.

The Disaster Profiteers: How Natural Disasters Make the Rich Richer and the Poor Even Poorer, JC Mutter – 2015

[DOC] Permission to experiment, the right to fail, and the opportunity to succeed: The role of temporary use in building resilient cities, S Vallance

… Collaborative Anthropologies, 1, pp. 1-32. Te Ara (nd) Historic Earthquakes, The 2011 Christchurch earthquake and other recent earthquakes, p. 13. http://www.teara. govt.nz/en/historic-earthquakes/page-13. Thorns, D. (2002). …

Social Media Benefits and Risks in Earthquake Events, H McLean – 2015

… 2013, p. 19). Hashtags are quickly formulated to spread information. For example, within minutes of the 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake, the hashtags #eqnz and #chch helped to share images and videos of the damage (Edmond 2013). … 

Lessons from post-earthquake Canterbury, S Vallance – The Routledge Handbook of Planning for Health and …, 2015

… But then, six months later, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake occurred almost directly under the city of Christchurch. … stuff. co. nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/4711189/Tuesday-quake-no- aftershock www. ccc. govt. nz/homeliving/civildefence/chchearthquake/ShareAnIdea. … 

Earthquake Risk Mitigation of Lifelines and Critical Facilities, K Pitilakis, S Argyroudis – 2015

… In case of strong earthquake motions, their physical damages and the consequent disruption of the services they provide may contribute seriously to the … in several cases to 10 %, 15 %, or even more in some extreme cases (eg, the water system in Christchurch, New Zealand) of …

[PDF] ‘Is a funeral a right?’Exploring indigent funerals from social work perspectives, P Thompson, P Yeung

… Recently, $10,000 was also granted to Christchurch earthquake victims (Christchurch earth- quake, 2011). Only the homicide grant is sufficient to pay average funeral costs. … Social Work, 52(4), 331-339. Christchurch earthquake: Latest news – Wednesday. (2011, 2 March). …

Descriptions of coping with commonly occurring events by highly self-regulated boys living in earthquake-affected Christchurch, SH Gillman – 2015

Children are often overlooked in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and children’s use of coping strategies plays an important part in their post-disaster adaptation (Vernberg, La Greca, Silverman, & Prinstein, 1996). The aim of this qualitative study was to explore the …

[PDF] Reallocating Children’s Time: Coping Strategies after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, R Novella, C Zanuso – 2015

… 10 Page 11. dramatic for Haiti (Cavallo et al. 2010). For instance, an earthquake of the same magnitude hit Christchurch, New Zealand’s second-largest city, that same year with no fatalities (see the case of Chile for a stronger earthquake in 2010). …

[HTML] A Framework for Managing Post-disaster Housing Reconstruction, AA Bilau, E Witt, I Lill – Procedia Economics and Finance, 2015

… 26–32. Gharaati and Davidson, 2008; Gharaati, M., Davidson, C., 2008. Who Knows Best? An Overview of Reconstruction after the Earthquake in Bam, Iran.In: Proceedings ofthe 4 th International i-Rec Conference, University of Canterbury. Christchurch, New Zealand. … 

Built to last, O Poland – 2015

… challenged” in the design phase, the new Haywards facility hasn’t been impacted by subsequent earthquakes in Christchurch and Wellington. … that Transpower rewrite the Haywards evacuation procedure which advises staff to leave the building in the event of an earthquake. …

 

 

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Time for a Peep Under the Rug

In terms of the most costly earthquakes on the planet since the 1950s, the Christchurch earthquakes were the 13th (Sept 4th 2010), 17th (Feb 22nd 2011) and 18th (June 13th 2011) most costly. (For a breakdown of the most costly see http://catastropheinsight.aonbenfield.com/Top10/Global-Earthquake-Economic-Insured-Loss-Events.pdf).

After the September 4, 2010 earthquake, the New Zealand current-account deficit (http://topics.bloomberg.com/new-zealand/) as a share of the economy, was reduced to a value near the smallest in a decade as local insurance companies received reinsurance payments from overseas. A catastrophe reinsurance payout is triggered if the aggregate of all of a reinsured’s policy claims arising from the defined event exceeds a specified threshold. This threshold works in the same way as the excess on a retail policy. The shortfall was 2.3 percent of gross domestic product in the year ended December 31, according to Statistics New Zealand. The gap in the year through September was revised to 2.2 per cent from a previously reported 3.1 percent. There was a NZD 3.52 billion deficit in the fourth quarter. At this point in time it was clear that the reinsurers would fund a good portion of the damage arising from the September 4 earthquake. However, finding information on reinsurance payments for the later Canterbury earthquakes is far more elusive. Establishing the facts remains difficult and more transparency here is definitely required. Whether the insurers will actually pay out all they were given, is even less scrutable……….particularly as we see a growing trend toward cash settlements.
Claims for reimbursement thus first affect primary insurers, but Reinsurers usually bear the lion’s share of insured losses when a large natural disaster occurs. They diversify concentrated risks among themselves and pass a fraction of the losses on to the broader financial market. It follows that the reinsurance contract between the reinsurer and the insurer will govern what information the primary insurer is required to give to the reinsurer with respect to claims. Just as good faith is the underpinning principle between the insurer and the policyholder, so it is between the insurer and their reinsurers. In order to avoid liability, the onus is on the reinsurer to prove bad faith or unprofessional behaviour in effecting settlement. Throughout the early months post earthquakes, in Canterbury, there were firms employed specifically by the reinsurers to assess and audit insurers’ decisions regarding quantum of damages in order to ensure that damage assessments are being carried out accurately and judiciously.
Everyone who has a rug knows perfectly well that if you don’t look under it now and again nasty things have a tendency to grow there. I suspect it is the same in the insurance industry. What I mean is that after more than three years of going slow, altering building standards, apportionment and other earthquake shenanigans, nobody appears to be peeping under the rug. Things may be festering and crawling down there. ‘How so?’ you ask. Well, you may remember that the nice reinsurance people who came over after the initial earthquake events coughed up billions of dollars to our not-so-nice private insurers, after they (the reinsurers) saw the size of our problem – our shattered buildings and our ruined infrastructure. ‘We’re going to have to rebuild all these’ said our local insurers, but since then- the word ‘rebuild ‘ has got messed-about with. The government decided it could save the  Earthquake Commission a lot of money by introducing the MBIE Guidelines and fiddling with the essence of the Building Code, and by virtue of the EQC Act 1993, EQC were able to adopt it. “Hey that’s a good fiddle” said the local insurers, “why don’t we do this too. I tell you what, every time we engage an engineer to look at your property, we can tell them to just use the Minimum Standard Guidelines”. Many fat hands rubbed together and gleeful smiles lit up greedy faces. OK, reader, you’re asking ‘what’s this about?’ Actually it’s about what the private insurers were given by the reinsurers and what they actually paid or will pay out for repairs, and after three years, we want to know, who’s looking?
We and the reinsurers really ought to be looking because by my calculation the local private insurers are going to be paying out far less than they were given, unless of course some effective class action can be generated in relation to the fraudulent use of the MBIE Guidelines by the private insurers. That would be a game changer but in the absence of such legalities for now, it seems certain to me that the insurers will be looking forward to a very large ‘wind fall’ profit. And certainly recent information would prove that to be true. (Seehttp://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9749259/Strong-profit-increase-for-IAG and http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9667134/IAG-plan-raises-competition-issues).

Should we care? Absolutely we should, because those are the funds that should have rebuilt our homes properly and not stuffed resin into broken foundations and packed out walls to make them ‘vertical’ again.
We know that in the early days some low-level auditing was carried out by the reinsurers – to see what the private insurers were doing – but given the huge delays, one needs to ask the question ‘is anyone still looking?’ Is anyone keeping the insurance industry honest?  Reinsurers such as Aon, Swiss Re, Gen Re, Hanover Re, Munich Re, Zurich Re, all of whom have an interest in what’s happening here (there are some 30 reinsurers in total) really ought to take the time to come and check out the situation in this little backwater of the world.
In a global reinsurance market that has hundreds of billions to spend, the few billion that came into New Zealand is not big by global standards. But in terms of New Zealand’s gap it is a very significant amount of money. No doubt the Insurance Council will not agree but on the face of it there does appear to be a large discrepancy between what was received and what is being spent. And it is probably time that prudent reinsurers came back for a serious look at the situation and to establish what has and is really taking place. One of the problems of determining the true facts is the occluded nature of the negotiations between the private insurers and reinsurers e.g. when one earthquake event (September 4th, 2010) became three earthquake events ( Feb 22nd, 2011), and June 13, 2011) did the reinsurer pay out three times? The insurers might argue ‘that’s our business’ but I dispute that. It is everyone’s business. The insurers only ever held (hold) what they were paid, in trust, for the rebuild of the broken Christchurch money.
So what I’m saying is,“come on reinsurance industry it’s time for another (careful) look at what is really taking place in Christchurch. Look and let’s see what really happened and is happening, after all, the insurers may well have had three and a half years of interest on your/our money”.
                                                Insured loss (Actual )                Insured Loss  2013 (USD)
September 4, 2010                          3,100,000,000                                 3,200,000,000

February 22, 2011                         13,500,000,000                              14,200,000,000

June 13, 2011                                   1,800,000,000                                 1,900,000,000

From http://catastropheinsight.aonbenfield.com/Top10/Global-Earthquake-Economic-Insured-Loss-Events.pdf

Other resources
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/8999552/Earthquakes-boost-insurers-profits
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/4768223/Christchurch-earthquakes-drain-Commission-dollars
http://www.eqc.govt.nz/news/international-reinsurers-sign-up-to-eqc
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20130905_ab_analytics_re_market_outlook_external.pdf

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Research from earthquakes- health, engineering and miscellaneous

Health

What can England’s NHS learn from Canterbury New Zealand?  N Mays, J Smith – BMJ: British Medical Journal, 2013

Exploring hotspots of pneumococcal pneumonia and potential impacts of ejecta dust exposure following the Christchurch earthquakes,  AL Pearson, S Kingham, P Mitchell, P Apparicio – Spatial and Spatio-temporal …, 2013

The power of interaction rituals: The Student Volunteer Army and the Christchurch earthquakes  KV Lewis – International Small Business Journal, 2013

Christchurch Women’s Hospital: Analysis of Measured Earthquake Data During the 2011-2012 Christchurch Earthquakes  A Sridhar, A Kuang, J Garven, S Gutschmidt, JG Chase… – Earthquake Spectra, 2013

Crustal stress and fault strength in the Canterbury Plains, New Zealand  RA Holt, MK Savage, J Townend, EM Syracuse… – Earth and Planetary Science …, 2013

Vulnerabilities to Seismic Hazards in Coastal and River Environments: Lessons post the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 2010-2012, New Zealand,  EJ Kelland – 2013

After the disaster: Using the Big-Five to predict changes in mental health among survivors of the 2011 Christchurch earthquake  D Osborne, CG Sibley – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

Innovations and lessons learned from the Canterbury Earthquakes: Emergency department staff narratives  S Richardson, M Ardagh – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

Recovering from the earthquake: Early childhood teachers and children collaboratively telling stories about their experiences
A Bateman, S Danby – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

Social media and its impact on crisis communication: Case studies of Twitter use in emergency management in Australia and New Zealand  T Flew, A Bruns, JE Burgess, K Crawford, F Shaw – 2013

Keep Calm and Carry On? An Investigation of Teacher Burnout in a Post-disaster Context  JRC Kuntz, K Näswall, A Bockett – New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 2013

Preserving family and community: Women’s voices from the Christchurch earthquakes  L Gordon – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

Lessons from disaster: The power and place of story  C Mutch, J Marlowe – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

The on-going psychological toll from the Canterbury earthquakes: Stories from one community  L Gawith – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

Earthquake risk over time windows; Do people bias risk to the end of an interval?  J Velluppillai – 2013

Sailing through a river of emotions: Capturing children’s earthquake stories  C Mutch – Disaster Prevention and Management, 2013

… reflections on transference and countertransference in geographical research: relocation experiences from post‐disaster Christchurch, Aotearoa New Zealand  G Hutcheson – Area, 2013

Designing to heal: Post-disaster rebuilding to assist community recovery part B: Designing a process and product for recovery
J Donovan – Environment Design Guide, 2013

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF DEMOLITION ACTIVITIES IN THE CHRISTCHURCH CBD ON AIR QUALITY IN THE CHRISTCHURCH AIRSHED  V Salomon, M Noonan, T Mallett, C Needham

Children’s knowledge, cognitions and emotions surrounding natural disasters: An investigation of Year 5 students, Wellington, New Zealand.  TA King, RAC Tarrant, M DipTchg – Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma …, 2013

A general review of psychosocial factors relating to disaster recovery in the workplace in a 2010-2011 Canterbury context
R Garside, S Johal, K Naswall, DM Johnston – 2013

Engineering

Seismic response of 20‐story base‐isolated and fixed‐base reinforced concrete structural wall buildings at a near‐fault site, V Calugaru, M Panagiotou – Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics, 2013

A Review of Sprinkler System Effectiveness Studies  K Frank, M Spearpoint, C Fleischmann, N Gravestock – Fire Science Reviews, 2013

New Zealand 20th century sea level rise: Resolving the vertical land motion using space geodetic and geological data, A Fadil, P Denys, R Tenzer, HR Grenfell, P Willis – Journal of Geophysical Research: …, 2013
An evaluative framework for defects in new residential buildings: the New Zealand case  FE Rotimi – 2013
Effect of overburden stress and surcharge pressure on the liquefaction response of sands  RM Varghese, G Madhavi Latha – International Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, 2013
OVERVIEW OF BRIDGE PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2011 CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKE  A Palermo, L Wotherspoon, L Hogan, A Kivell…
Groundwater responses to the recent Canterbury earthquakes: a comparison  AK Gulley, NF Dudley Ward, SC Cox, JP Kaipio – Journal of Hydrology, 2013
STATE-OF-THE-ART REVIEW ON SEISMIC INDUCED POUNDING RESPONSE OF BRIDGE STRUCTURES   H HAO, K BI, N CHOUW, WEIXIN REN – Journal of Earthquake and Tsunami, 2013
Low-Damage Design Using a Gravity Rocking Moment Connection  M Jamil, P Quenneville, C Clifton – Materials and Joints in Timber Structures, 2014
Post-Earthquake Building Safety Inspection: Lessons from the Canterbury, New Zealand, Earthquakes  JD Marshall, K Jaiswal, N Gould, F Turner, B Lizundia… – Earthquake Spectra, 2013
Ceiling systems design and installation lessons from the Canterbury Earthquakes  RP Dhakal, G MacRae – 2013
High‐resolution relocation of aftershocks of the Mw 7.1 Darfield, New Zealand, earthquake and implications for fault activity
EM Syracuse, CH Thurber, CJ Rawles, MK Savage… – Journal of Geophysical …, 2013
Maximum seismic displacements evaluation of steel frames from their post-earthquake residual deformation  AA Christidis, EG Dimitroudi, GD Hatzigeorgiou… – Bulletin of Earthquake …, 2013
Pile response in submerged lateral spreads: Common pitfalls of numerical and physical modeling techniques  YK Chaloulos, GD Bouckovalas, DK Karamitros – Soil Dynamics and Earthquake …, 2013

MISCELLANEOUS

The role of spontaneous construction for post-disaster housing  D Félix, A Feio, JM Branco, JS Machado – 2013
Dogs in Action: Working Dogs and Their Stories  M Alomajan – 2013
Rental affordability1998–2012: Regional distributions  SN Zealand – 2013
Rural organizational impacts, mitigation strategies, and resilience to the 2010 Darfield earthquake, New Zealand  ZR Whitman, TM Wilson, E Seville, J Vargo… – Natural Hazards, 2013
Update of Regional Moment Tensor Analysis for Earthquakes in New Zealand and Adjacent Offshore Regions  J Ristau – Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America

The Christchurch earthquake sequence: government decision-making and confidence in the face of uncertainty  JE Taylor – 2013
Seismic Performance of a Six Storey Reinforced Concrete Masonry Building during the Canterbury Earthquakes  J Centeno, CE Ventura, JM Ingham – Earthquake Spectra, 2013
Staying Alive! SME Survival after Christchurch Earthquakes  J Radford, R Addison, H Ahmed – 2013
After the quake: The complex dance of local government, national government and accounting  F Miley, A Read – Accounting History, 2013
Whispering Walls  K Duddumpudi, J Moloney, T Moleta
A seismic study of active faults, Canterbury, New Zealand  J Arthur – 2013
Individual Differences in Movements in Response to Natural Disasters Tsunami and Earthquake Case Studies  WS Helton, S Kemp, D Walton – Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics …, 2013
A community-led, science-informed conversation around the future use of the Avon River Residential Red Zone  S Vallance, P Tait – 2013
‘Build back better’principles for land-use planning  S Mannakkara, S Wilkinson – Proceedings of the ICE-Urban Design and Planning, 2013
Risk-based land use planning for natural hazard risk reduction  WSA Saunders, JG Beban, M Kilvington – 2013

Review Article: Potential geomorphic consequences of a future great (M w= 8.0+) Alpine Fault earthquake, South Island, New Zealand  TR Robinson, TRH Davies – Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 2013
The Canterbury Support Line: A Review of the Literature and Evaluation of the Service  B Miles, MJ Dorahy, K Naswall, S Malinnn, G McNatty – 2013
Fine grained sediment clean-up in a modern urban environment  M Villemure – 2013
Shaking Loose: Sand volcanoes and Jurassic earthquakes  C Rowe – Geology, 2013
Re: Start the heart of Christchurch: Turning around a traumatised city  J Donovan – Planning News, 2013
Integrating disaster risk reduction into post‐disaster reconstruction: A long‐term perspective of the 1931 earthquake in Napier, New Zealand  M Hill, JC Gaillard – New Zealand Geographer, 2013

Children, citizenship and environment: Nurturing a democratic imagination in a changing world by Bronwyn Hayward, Routledge Earthscan, Oxon, NY, 2012. 208 pp. …  BE Wood – New Zealand Geographer, 2013
Financial Seismic Risk Analysis of Building Portfolios  H Yoshikawa, K Goda – Natural Hazards Review, 2013
Organizational Networks and Recovery following the Canterbury Earthquakes  JR Stevenson, Y Chang-Richards, D Conradson… – Earthquake Spectra, 2013
Human rights and dignity: lessons from the Canterbury rebuild and recovery effort  MJV White, A Grieve – Asia-Pacific Disaster Management, 2014
The slow road to recovery: a city rebuilds under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011  E Toomey – Asia-Pacific Disaster Management, 2014

Related articles

• Earthquake clustering, complex fault ruptures, and the geologic record (geosociety.wordpress.com)
• Seismic issues a grant winner for uni (stuff.co.nz)

“On Track”: More Insurance Spin! – Guest blog by Herman Meijburg

The recent data published by the NZ Insurance Council (NZIC) about the residential repairs and rebuilds are an interesting read.

At first sight the data sketch an optimistic picture, but statistics require “close reading” in order for us to understand exactly what information we are looking at. On March 1^st 2013, I posted a guest blog on the Christchurch Fiasco website dealing with the latest figures on the residential rebuild as presented by Michael Wright in the Christchurch Press. In comparison with those statistics we now seem to have a more accurate account of the number of damaged homes in the greater Christchurch area, some 172,100 (over and under cap)! That is 61,241 more than I calculated in February 2013. It shows that the property problem is actually bigger than I anticipated at the time. As a consequence of this rise in numbers the number of properties managed by EQC and the insurers has also gone up: today 147,100 properties are “under the cap” and 24,660 “over the cap”. These figures represent a significant change from those we were provided with in February 2013. The first conclusion is that we probably now have better data to draw conclusions from today- which is a gain. It also reveals that the number of properties damaged by the Canterbury earthquakes is much larger than initially thought. An explanation for this jump in numbers could be that in February 2013, some two and a half years after the initial quake in September 2010, many properties were still waiting to be assessed. This prolonged delay came as a shock and at the time caught the attention of the media. Hence, when the EQC claims management system was exposed by a whistleblower in April 2013 (See http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/rebuilding-christchurch/8469811/EQC-privacy-breach-affects-83-000), Ian Simpson (EQC chief executive) had to apologize publicly and promise to get all outstanding claims properly assessed within a 6 month period. (Seehttp://www.3news.co.nz/Keeping-EQC-to-its-word-in-Christchurch/tabid/817/articleID/306947/Default.aspx#.UnlVEcr2-os). This may account for the substantial rise in numbers.

As of 1st of October 2013, we now know that by the end of the third quarter of 2013, 24,660 properties were insurer-managed; that is 6,160 properties up from the February 2013 statistics! Of those 24,660 properties some 41% have had their claims resolved. How have the insurers resolved those claims? They did so by rebuilding 650 properties (3% of 24,660), repairing 590 properties (2% of 24,660) and resolving 8,760 properties “externally” (36% of 24,660). “External resolution” refers to any situation in which the loss incurred is resolved outside the project management office controlled by the insurance company. This means that the resolution for the property is no longer under the insurance company’s remit. This includes cash settlements and house reinstatements. On the basis of these figures we can draw more conclusions. First of all, that up through to the third quarter of this year the insurance companies have had a 5% direct, hands-on involvement in the repair/rebuild of residential properties. This in sharp contrast to the 36% of properties in which an external solution was achieved. Offering cash settlements or house re-instatements means that the insurance companies walked away from any direct involvement, mitigating any future risks for themselves and leaving the property owners to deal with the aftermath of that resolution. This is a trend we are also seeing in EQC repairs. In the report prepared by the Controller and Auditor-General, Earthquake Commission Managing the Canterbury Home Repair programme, the writers state that “In our view, increasing the use of cash-settling to meet this deadline could be counter to the objectives of the home-repair programme if it contributes to cost inflation or the offer to cash settle is made to a homeowner who does not have the capacity to manage repairs on their own.” “As at August 2013, the home-repair programme would need to average about 2250 repairs each month to be completed by the end of 2014. This calculation assumes that EQC will not cash-settle large numbers of remaining claims. (See http://www.oag.govt.nz/2013/eqc/2013/eqc/docs/oag-earthquake-commission.pdf).

We now have enough information about the aftermath of those kinds of settlements. They often leave the property owner many hundreds of thousands dollars out of pocket, unable to rebuild their home ‘like for like’. I suggest you read the recent guest blogs by Arian Cowie and Kevin Seque on this matter.

As property owners have become aware of this “settlement” tactic and other external resolutions of the insurers, the number has dropped considerably amongst the category of properties “with the resolution still in progress”. In only 2,600 cases external resolutions are being sought; that is only 11% of the 24,660 properties in comparison to the 36% of the properties which had their claims resolved in the third quarter of this year. In line with this lower outcome for external resolutions the figure for insurers managed repairs and rebuilds has gone up considerably. Insurer managed rebuilds in progress went up to 3,840 properties (16% of 24,660) and insurer managed repairs in progress went up to 4,490 properties (18% of 24,660). Added together the insurer managed repairs and rebuilds comprise 34% of the properties with resolution in progress i.e. not yet completed.

Insurers involved in the Canterbury rebuild add the number of properties which have had their claims resolved and the ones with resolution in progress together, claiming that 87% of their over the cap residential property claims have been either fully completed or have an agreed resolution in progress. On the basis of this percentage the insurers say they are on track to meet their 2016 deadline when all earthquake claims are set to be resolved. But when looking at the number of claims resolved by the end of the third quarter of this year, the 1,240 repairs and rebuilds done represent only 5% of the 24,660 claims. The 34% of insurers managed repairs and rebuilds in progress may well present the insurers with a big problem. In numbers the 8,330 repairs and rebuilds in progress as opposed to the 1,240 repairs and rebuilds done means that that in the forthcoming two years the insurers have to do nearly 7 times more repairs and rebuilds than they have done through the 3^rd quarter of this year. It is not going to happen in the timeframe insurers have set for themselves. This for obvious reasons I mentioned in my previous blog. Repairs and rebuilds will pose more difficulties; they will be more complicated and will need more redesign work. Managing insurers will be confronted with complicated consent procedures to meet the revised building codes and during that period building costs will continue to rise and labour will become more scarce.

We haven’t mentioned the 3,420 properties (14% of 24,660) without confirmed settlements options which include 540 properties without any kind of offer yet. Nor is there mention of the numbers of people involved in legal proceedings- of which there are at least 250 homeowners. I take it that all these 3,420 properties will be resolved in one way or another. If we take the line that most of these properties will eventually be “insurer managed” repairs or rebuilds, the insurers would have to do nearly 9 to 10 times as many repairs and rebuilds in the years 2015/2016 than the insurers achieved through the 3^rd quarter of this year. That means that the insurers will need to do well over 300 repairs/rebuilds a month till the end of 2016 (39 months). The Insurance Counsel figures state that in the last three months of this quarter they completed 540 repairs/rebuilds which equates to 160 repairs/rebuilds a month. (See ‘We’re on track say insurers’, Ashleigh Stewart, The Press, Nov 4, 2013). If they are to achieve these figures -as of today the insurers will need to double their efforts otherwise they will not meet their 2016 target. In turn we, the affected public, will keep track of whether the insurance companies actually deliver on the goals they have set for themselves. Otherwise their statistics are just another smoke screen.

Related articles

• http://plainsfm.org.nz/on-demand/mornings-Sarah-Miles-nov6/
• http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/9357702/Insurers-insist-they-re-on-track
• http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/9366106/EQC-report-echoes-long-standing-complaints
• Brownlee defends EQC performance (stuff.co.nz)
• Auditor-General says EQC inconsistent in Canterbury (radionz.co.nz)

Herman Meijburg, West Melton, November 5^th, 2013

CASH SETTLEMENTS BEWARE – Guest Blog by Kevin Seque

There is a major danger looming for the building industry – and in turn you the Homeowner

Insurers have started and I predict, will aggressively move in 2014 to cash settle as many claims as possible.
Because of the slowness of Insurers to settle the claim, the frustrated, stressed and impatient customers, many will take these cash settlements without consideration for the escalation allowance between the time of accepting the settlement offer and the time the construction contract being accurately priced and signed, the unseen damage and un-costed foundations coupled with potential hyperinflation in materials and labour as the recovery accelerates through 2014/15.
From the claims I have settled, to date my experience shows that homeowners have no concept of the time involved in the preparation work required to get a house to the “on site builder’s hammer” stage. Most home owners are unaware that an “easy” build (single level 3-4 bedroom up to 200-230 square metres on a level site with easy access takes on average, currently a minimum of six months from a “standing start” (this is when you are advised you are a rebuild, and the amount you have to spend on your new home).
You need to engage an architect/draughtsman to discuss and design concepts, then arrange engineer designed foundations, geotechnical report, and survey, once these reports are received they are then incorporated into working drawings and submitted to Council. For Aurum’s applications in Wellington, permits are received within 15 working days for architecturally designed homes. In Christchurch, Aurum is allowing and working on a 55 day turnaround to obtain a permit.
For you the homeowner there is a major risk for unfunded cost overruns as the repairs or rebuilds (in contradiction with the policy terms and principals of Insurance settlement) are only being scoped to a “notional” claims position rather than to actual cost. Insurers and their PMO’s are making “best guess” allowances for foundations, particularly in TC3, and cost overruns can be $ tens of thousands of dollars out. Recent foundation examples that the KSL Audit / Aurum building system has assisted;

A St Albans TC3 claimant $94,000, a Halswell TC2 claimant $38,000, a TC2 Papanui client $52,000 and a Green Hill, Mount Pleasant client $18,000.
A rebuild offer for a Redcliffs client of $245,000 on completion of all of the plans and settlement (time lapse 9 months) resulted in a rebuild cost of $343,000 and there will be a foundation allowance overrun still to be negotiated.
A St Martin’s TC3 client had a $54,000 additional foundation overrun.
A Papanui rebuild of $386,000 eventually was agreed by the insurer at $482,000 and has only now been settled as the foundations and framing are now in place on this TC3 site and there has been no foundation cost overrun.
A Cashmere client was offered $440,000 and has recently settled for $592,000.
A St Albans Claimant’s repair was costed in 2011 at $320,000 and after KSL requested an escalation update was offered $406,000. Aurum have advised KSL the same repair has been costed at $440,000.
A Parklands resident had been costed as a repair at initially $217,000 then on review increased to $274,000 and the actual builder’s costed repair is $396,000.
If you are intending to self-manage your rebuild (which will allow you to build in whatever style, construction, design or size without betterment) make sure you get professional advice on how and when to settle your claim or you could end up being unnecessarily, financially disadvantaged. None of the Banks are displaying any concerted effort to assist clients who wish to self-manage, so are likely to have little appetite for greater risk and advances through cost overruns.

Builder defaults.
Even on a fixed price contract the builder is not liable for additional engineering or foundation issues. If the builder takes on a direct customer and there is a foundation cost overrun the builder will not know that a “potential” customer default will occur, until they are at least two thirds of the way through the build.
Whilst the customer may have paid for the cost overrun at the time that the foundations were laid, they may not have sufficient capital to fund the full project, necessitating mortgagee sales, additional finance issues resulting in delays and costs and could financially destabilise the building company.
Ensure you take professional advice from a qualified Insurance Claims Advocate and /or Legal Adviser who understands the building industry at the “micro” (nuts and bolts) level if you are considering a “Cash Settlement” and intend to be a Self- Managed rebuild.

Written by Kevin Seque 43 years insurance industry experience.
 

A Change of Heart: the Labour Party has put disaster coverage on the agenda- some sense at last!

Here in Christchurch we have been struggling with our insurance companies for well over three years. Through the often heart-breaking stories of affected Cantabrians, as regularly reported in the media, people have become aware that the way insurance companies have operated post quakes has complicated the recovery and the lives of many. Political parties have woken up to the idea that something has to be done to prevent such a fiasco from happening again. New Zealand First and now the Labour Party, at its recent annual meeting (in Christchurch this week-end) has placed the way we organise our insurance as a major item on their agenda. After the Christchurch Insurance Aftershock, the recent damaging earthquakes in the Seddon area, and the side effects of those earthquakes on our capital, as well as the recent prediction of a “9 percent chance of the rupture of a major upper South Island fault that will likely result in a 7.7 magnitude quake” (http://www.3news.co.nz/Civil-Defence-emails-reveal-earthquake-risk/tabid/423/articleID/319849/Default.aspx#ixzz2jWNyR3qn, it has become clear that New Zealanders can no longer leave these matters “to the market”. Today, even our politicians are finally realizing that the private insurance industry will be neither capable nor willing to meet the needs of the population in the face of further disaster. When I wrote The Christchurch Fiasco: the Insurance Aftershock and its Implications for New Zealand and Beyond, it was uppermost in my mind that a sovereign nation cannot continue to manage disaster the way this Government has approached it. I wrote:

“The whole fiasco demonstrates very clearly that catastrophe insurance is too important to be left to private insurers. It represents a major conflict of ideologies. Corporate entities are about profit and returns to shareholders. It is a mistaken premise to think that insurance companies will act either altruistically or with compassion. Privately owned, profit-based corporations are not philosophically oriented to look after the welfare of a community confronted with a disaster on the scale of the Christchurch earthquakes. Insurers will always give priority to their financial bottom-line and seek to maximise profits and minimise payments to policyholders. The Christchurch experience demonstrates that ‘good faith’ is nothing more than a slogan”. Chapter 7, “Catastrophe Insurance: Why the Government Should Provide it”, page 169.
So I am gratified to note that at the recent Labour Party Conference, Hon. David Cunliffe announced his party’s intention to introduce a very similar version of my proposal (KiwiSure) which Labour has chosen to call KiwiAssure. Predictably, the Insurance Council chief executive Tim Grafton says that the policy is an ill-conceived step backwards. (see http://www.3news.co.nz/Labours-insurance-plan-panned-by-Insurance-Council/tabid/423/articleID/319857/Default.aspx#ixzz2jWRETvaG). His statement; “New Zealand already has a responsive, innovative and responsible private insurance industry and to suggest that further state ownership is the answer, begs me to ask what on earth is the question?” is of course, simply not true and would indicate that Mr Grafton has not been watching the news over the past three years nor listening to the people of Canterbury. The insurance industry (and the Government) have had ample opportunity to pick up their game and begin to deal with the people transparently and honestly- if you leave it to the market – the market will respond – Labour has responded and the industry will now reap its’ just desserts. Labour is to be applauded for a huge step forward and the foresight to realize that the Nation cannot rely on foreign owned corporate entities to keep our best interests in mind.

The major difference between my KiwiSure proposal and KiwiAssure as proposed by Labour appears to be the use of the existing KiwiBank facility, rather than a completely restructured Earthquake Commission. In this respect, I think Labour’s approach is both clever and efficient but it is not yet clear whether the proposal is a total disaster management proposal with continuous reinvestment into a national fund or whether it would be an amalgamated profit-centre with annual returns to the Government via KiwiBank? Kiwibank Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of the state-owned enterprise New Zealand Post Limited. It is my personal conviction that any rational scheme must be financially compounded year on year under legislation which prevents any Government-of-the-day to co-opt the funds for any other purpose other than the management of disaster. In this respect the rapid growth of the fund is assured together with a reducing requirement for large premiums for government reinsurance. One of the problems in the past has been that respective governments have dipped into the Natural Disaster Fund whenever they have required additional funds – so the Natural Disaster Fund (read Earthquake Commission) was severely depleted at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes. Measures must be put in place to ensure that Governments are not able to use these funds for any other purpose than natural disaster. (See “Can New Zealand Afford another big quake?” http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/insight/20130616 ). If the scheme embraces the whole population and given that in the interim no major disaster occurs, then, within a relatively short timeframe, the scheme would be essentially self supporting and able to effectively manage even a very major event.

The likely election result of a, Labour, Greens and New Zealand First Coalition has an absolutely superb opportunity for Kiwis to truly run their own affairs in respect of both pre-disaster planning and post-disaster management without the interference of foreign corporates and private right-wing agendas. New Zealand First already appears to be on-side (See “New Zealand should Consider establishing a State insurer – Peters” http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11143113 –.) And I agree with his sentiments when he stated that Prime Minister John Key’s Government had not been “showing the leadership it should have shown, or has given the necessary directives to the insurance industry” since the earthquakes. It would now be encouraging to hear the Green Party comment favourably on Labour’s proposals.
From the point of view of disaster management, it seems unnecessary that KiwiAssure would initially waste both the effort and the finance on provision of motor and home contents insurance, although including these in the mix would provide for sufficient country-wide staff with the required skill sets ready to cope with a major catastrophic event. For the time being I would suggest leaving motor and content insurance to the market. The issue of catastrophe insurance is urgent and consequently it would be better to start by perfecting the management of our major concern, which is both commercial and residential real-estate insurance together with the coverage of business interruption insurance. When those aspects are fully operational and under control, an extension of the scheme might then be implemented.
On a personal note, now enduring my fourth year of tribulation at the hands of a foreign private insurer (IAG), it is my conviction that the only satisfactory solution will emerge when we Kiwis do it for ourselves and KiwiAssure is to be commended for taking the first steps toward this outcome. In my next blog I intend to address some outstanding issues of the Labour proposal and ask some of the questions that require further debate.

Great Stuff!!

Related articles

• Labour’s plans for NZ-owned insurance company (radionz.co.nz)
• Cunliffe announces new Labour insurance policy (stuff.co.nz)

~Future Proofing for a sustainable, participatory, democratic society.

https://thechristchurchfiasco.wordpress.com

If you would like to contribute a post on this topic then see Guest Archives.

Corruption

“Whoever is careless with the truth in small matters cannot be trusted with important matters”.

Corruption – It is one of the world’s most baffling social problems – the dynamic relationship between state power, corruption, corporate power and organized crime and it is alive and well in Christchurch. Many of the decisions, actions and inactions arguably amount to organizational deviance which, when combined with human rights violations, amounts to state crime, systemic corruption, state collusion, corporate crime, and negligence as well as post-disaster cover-ups.

If you’re saying to yourself – those questionable wheelings and dealings in Christchurch in the aftermath of the earthquakes is not corruption, then you are severely mistaken. The corruption can be traced to systematic, pervasive government corruption, hand-in-glove with the global abuse of trust by ‘professionals’ who have conflicts of interest, together with corporate dishonesty by insurers and financiers.

Perhaps you think corruption is not really a crime, or merely an economic crime – yet it is not a victimless crime – it involves the looting of tax payers’ money and we are witnessing a rising amount of corporate and professional corruption in the private sector in Christchurch today. This systematic dishonesty is undermining the recovery and the efficiency of what we get for our dollar. What we need is a system to protect Cantabrians from the ravages of the dishonesty we are experiencing. If you think that corruption is only a small problem and that it has been with us forever and that there is little we can do about it – then you believe in a very dangerous myth which is leading us down a very dark road of which thousands of Cantabrian householders have bitter experience.
A civil society must have a transparent financial governance, which entails the need for more honesty and competence from our civil leaders. It requires corporate and professional social responsibility – and must provide us all with the tremendous opportunity to create a better world. It is actually We, the people, who have the ultimate influence over our elected officials, although the people rarely stop to consider this, but it is my belief that they will soon do so. Civil society needs to rise to the occasion. We have to find an effective remedy – collective action is required.
Yes, insurance IS one of mankind’s greatest inventions and when it works as intended it provides a level of protection to individuals which was at one time, second to none, but when it does not function honestly, wide scale misery is the result as it has been in Canterbury.
True, the power of the insurance industry to remedy disaster is enormous but it is also true that it has no inherent moral character. It is not owned by the people, nor does it work for the best outcomes for the people. What is critical to citizens post disaster, when they are at their most vulnerable, is the importance they attach to that aspect of character called honesty. The current political system is very clearly facilitating the greed of the big insurance corporates and big business generally. This Parliament and this Government have done little or nothing to call them to account – leading to a failure to protect our ordinary citizens against profit-hungry, foreign-owned corporates – leading to the further enrichment of a few of the wealthy at the general expense of New Zealand society. Any sense of social justice would have led an honest government to prohibit these activities. It is also true that it is a fact that the legal system is in place to enforce certain aspects of “good behaviour”, but most good behaviour is voluntary and in any case, access to the civil legal system has been permitted to attain a status which is out of reach of all but the wealthy.

Let us not forget that it is politics that has shaped ‘the market’, to which Mr Brownlee is so apt to refer, and it has shaped the ways in which corporates now have great advantage at the expense of the citizen. Any well-functioning economic system must have rules and regulations; it must operate within a fair and reasonable legal framework. We require behaviour by regulators that prevents political/corporate pressures from dictating political and social policy. The legal framework for the protection of policyholders in this country is all but absent. Making myopic decisions based on the short-run political considerations by the party in power in respect of insurance behaviour and regulation, is not wise policymaking. Public policy relating to insurance needs to be built on principles, not expediency. For example, the decision to reduce EQC’s liability by creating the MBIE ‘minimum guidelines’ for repair, has saddled many unsuspecting Christchurch homeowners with future liabilities for many years to come. Only a structure based on well-designed principle will lead to better outcomes for those at risk and add to an improvement in social wellbeing. Such principles would require that the insurance industry and EQC not take advantage of short-term profit opportunities such as altering premiums dramatically (without any discussion with its policyholders), abandon some of its customers and/ or leave the market entirely (e.g. Ansvar).

I argue that it is the asymmetry in relations between the people and those in power which has led to failing governance. We need the capacity to reintroduce the integrity of politics into our small arena. The impact of corruption in governance is insidious and on-going and until it is stopped the future for Christchurch and New Zealand looks bleak.
It is a global fact that the worst projects are usually realized first in post disaster situations and developed in the most unlikely sets of circumstances – projects that produce no economic benefits – projects such as the anchor projects proposed for Christchurch. Rather than producing benefits for the community they do damage instead, they bring indebtedness to the community at the expense of public amenities and parks and they bring division in the society. Yet together, by consortia of government, banks and insurers, driven by unholy alliances between powerful elites and suppliers, who are the actors in the global marketplace, these projects get the go ahead and they are invariably driven by large-scale corruption. Systematic corruption is perverting our economy and ultimately our recovery.

As many of you will know, I have followed the history of the Christchurch scenario very closely since the outset of the so-called ‘recovery’ and one of the most disturbing aspects I have found in the post quake environment in Christchurch, throughout the insurance process, is the level of dishonesty and self-serving – not only from the insurance industry but the industries that support it – such as the professional engineering firms, the quantity surveyors, loss adjustors, builders and lawyers etc. I have been utterly disgusted at the levels people are prepared to sink to for a ‘quick buck’. For many of these ‘insurance industry supporting roles’, integrity and trust left the building on the day the September 4th earthquake happened and has rarely been seen to surface since.

Let us not forget that a political system allocates – by action as well as inaction in a variety of channels – one very important value: life safety. Despite their apparently mundane nature, decisions on building codes are at the heart of life safety allocations, for such decisions determine, at least in probabilistic terms, who dies in an eventual further disaster: where, when and how. Yet we are constantly seeing the standards allocated to life safety dropping. ( see http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/9261735/Appeal-on-building-strengthening-quashed).

Building code violations are part of a well entrenched political process of give and take between the same major key players i.e. professional groups, government and industry. But it is the local population who suffer. There is regrettably little evidence of a professional culture within these affiliated industries or their governing bodies to ensure safe practice.
Conflicts of interest seem to be prevalent everywhere – such as when an individual or organization is involved in multiple interests, one of which could possibly corrupt the motivation for an act in the other. Most professions have clear statements around what is and isn’t a conflict of interest and the professionals flouting the standards are fully aware. If an engineer working for a private insurer only scopes a damaged building on the basis of a repair because that’s what he’s told to do – he has at that moment, lost all professional integrity – yet all around the city there are engineers doing just that. Some are working for insurers and clients at the same time!!

When trust exists in an organization or in a relationship, almost everything else is easier and more comfortable to achieve. Immediately you are left feeling able to rely on the person working for/with you, cooperating becomes easier as does taking thoughtful risks, and believable communication becomes a reality. Yet the insurance industry and the global corporate sector, in its relationship with many of our citizens, and modest enterprises, has been and is, committing a form of grand larceny.

The people need government which is prepared to sit around the table and talk about the means to eliminate the corruption and dishonesty taking place, rather than to promulgate it – and of course, the silent population out there is aware of it. My question is – why isn’t the population demanding more of its public servants? Will we put up with this until we are all financially ruined?
In addition to public lands being made available for privatization, various enterprising firms and
individuals, relying on populist government practice, are likely to be able to build on undeveloped public land before it becomes available for sale. Restrictive rules and regulations are repealed to encourage ‘entrepreneurs’. The commencement of virgin construction companies, relying on the help of friends in local politics to win contracts, companies that will simply disappear after the work dries up, leaving the homeowner with nowhere to turn when the shoddy workmanship goes bad (just as it did with the leaky home scenario). All of these things constitute corruption.

We are seeing building code violations oriented around ‘trade-offs’ between the ‘core values’ of the major players such as professional groups, government and industry at the expense of the homeowner.  This incestuousness and the corruption which it nurtures institutionalizes and legitimizes the trade-offs. The advantage for the state is twofold: the incestuousness creates the climate which allows local corruption to flourish; corruption, in turn, ensures the provision of cheap mass housing with substantial profits. Corruption is thus a cheap and devolved means by which our Government seeks to ‘address’ the social housing crisis. Yet what we see is the continued prevalence of examples such as this:

“Council Manager, Resource Consents, John Higgins said the Council welcomed the changes. “The amendments mean the majority of repairs for lower level land damage, including repairs for undulating land, localised ponding, lateral spreading, land cracking, settlement or new groundwater springs will become permitted activities. While some of these repairs will require geotechnical engineer oversight and approval, no resource consent will be required.” (See http://www.ccc.govt.nz/thecouncil/newsmedia/mediareleases/2013/201310104.aspx) and http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/canterbury-earthquake/224292/minister-makes-fixing-quake-damaged-land-easier).   The civil engineering practice of deep bore hole investigations would reveal to contractors,  consultant engineers and authorities the dangers inherent in the soil conditions. Yet what we are seeing is a purposeful intention not to carry out these tests or only test shallow bores or simply not at all or to an inappropriate standard. Why, because it saves the Earthquake Commission or the private insurer money. The Government (central and local) know that if they wash their hands of as many consents as possible, then they are not liable for the problems that will surface down the track. This is corruption.

The body that creates the codes and building standards is the Ministry of Building, Innovation and Employment. However, the implementation of these codes and regulations is not the
responsibility of this Ministry but of the local governments, and the local governments are not  responsible to the Ministry … so there is a dichotomy between who’s responsible and who makes the
rules. That is one of the primary reasons that they are enforced in a confused and ineffective way. In addition there is no mechanism for the inclusion of public participation, yet on the ground in Christchurch there are many concerned citizens lamenting what is taking place. No doubt local interest groups (private developers and contractors) have a stranglehold on the urban planning process, including decisions on what land will be developed, when and how, and on raising urban land rents. And while the Government has sent someone down from ‘head office’ to ‘reconfigure’ the consenting process for repair and construction of homes in Canterbury, an intrinsic component of government ties local political networks to the national government framework and its own agenda. In this way local processes can be manoeuvred from ‘above’.

(See http://www.rebuildchristchurch.co.nz/blog/2013/10/resource-consents-streamlined-under-new-rules) and ( http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/8866474/Govt-steps-in-over-Chch-consents-debacle).

It is a community’s political system that decides authoritatively through the public policy process who will get how much life safety and who will pay for it. When the next earthquake disaster occurs in Christchurch we will be able to categorically link the undisputed lack of adequate engineering, lack of industry inspection and quality assurance, cheaply and ineffectively repaired buildings to state laxity and the deaths that arise.

Corruption is alive and well in Christchurch! What are you going to do about it??

http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/9025773/Rumblings-of-rebellion-in-Christchurch
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/8967525/Concern-over-EQC-assessments
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/9028805/Lawyers-cry-foul-over-EQC-rewiring-stance
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/9054065/Surveyor-calls-for-EQC-audit

Latest Research from the Christchurch earthquakes – Health, Engineering and Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous

Airports: sources of economic growth and disaster resilience
M Coetzee – Australian Institute of Traffic Planning and Management …, 2013
… It uses the example of the role of Christchurch Airport in supporting the recovery of the city of
Christchurch after the 2011 earthquake, and demonstrates how sound planning in an around
an airport provides the opportunity to increase the resilience to the city as whole. …

Soil profile inversion in earthquake-induced liquefaction-affected soils and the potential effects on urban trees
J Morgenroth, P Almond, BC Scharenbroch, TM Wilson… – Geoderma, 2014
… Immediately after the Christchurch I earthquake, only 384 tree removals occurred on
public lands, most of which were presenting an obvious earthquake-related structural
defect (eg lean, soil mounding near the root plate, stem splitting). …

Red Zone as Green Corridor: Opportunities for Suburban Intensification: A Christchurch Case Study
ST Constable – 2013
Victoria University Red Zone as Green Corridor: Opportunities for Suburban Intensification: A
Christchurch Case Study. ResearchArchive/Manakin Repository. Login. … Red Zone as Green
Corridor: Opportunities for Suburban Intensification: A Christchurch Case Study. …

Characterizing social response to urban earthquakes using cell-phone network data: the 2012 oaxaca earthquake
B Moumni, V Frias-Martinez, E Frias-Martinez – … of the 2013 ACM conference on …, 2013
… Using cellphone data to measure population movements experimental analysis following the
22 february 2011 christchurch earthquake new zeeland gorvetment, isbn 978-0–478–37759-
0 (2012). 9. Tatem, AJ, Qiu, Y., Smith, DL, Sabot, O., Ali, AS, Moonen, B., et al. …

Paradigmatic Rejuvenation
W Conway – 2013
… The thesis specifically asks whether establishing a mall typology as a landmark building within
the inner city can strategically engage the damaged historic buildings of post-earthquake
Christchurch in ways that actively preserve these historic remnants. …

A study of the role of rainwater tanks as an emergency water source for the Wellington region following a major earthquake on the Wellington Fault
J Beban, DM Johnston, C Stewart, WJ Cousins – 2013
… Making the worst-case assumption that a prolonged dry period coincides with a major earthquake
on the Wellington Fault, the following … For example, Stevenson (1980) reported lead levels in
Christchurch rainwater ranging from 0.005-0.031 mg/L, compared to a background …

Developing Local Partners in Emergency Planning and Management: Lyttleton Time Bank as a Builder and Mobiliser of Resources during the Canterbury …
JL Ozanne, LK Ozanne – 2013
… Earthquake 2011a). Like a large portion of Christchurch, Lyttelton lost power, water, and sewage.
By the … PHOTO 1. A RNZN Member serves food to the Lyttleton Community as part of the disaster
recovery of the Christchurch Earthquake on 23 February, 2011. Page 13. 11 …

Seismic Damage Accumulation of Highway Bridges in Earthquake Prone Regions
J Ghosh, JE Padgett, M Sánchez-Silva – Earthquake Spectra, 2013
… buildings whose condition was still “satisfactory” after the first two main shocks, suffered “serious
to very serious” (partial or total collapse) during the October 14 earthquake. Similarly, in
Christchurch, New Zealand, several structures weakened from the magnitude 7.1 Darfield …

Intended evacuation behaviour in a local earthquake and tsunami at Napier, New Zealand
SA Fraser, DM Johnston, GS Leonard – 2013
… for siren systems to fail due to power outages in a significant local earthquake, and the …
http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/en/environmentwaste/naturalhazardsemergencies/
civilDefence/Pages/civil_defence_and_emergency_management_home.aspx), and Christchurch ( …

Soil profile characterization of Christchurch strong motion stations
LM Wotherspoon, RP Orense, BA Bradley, BR Cox… – 2013
… However, acceleration records from the 2011 Christchurch earthquake showed a clear indication
of liquefaction of the underlying soils, with characteristic acceleration spikes and reduced high
frequency content in the latter part of the record (Bradley & Cubrinovski 2011). …

Evaluation of Rubber/Sand Mixtures as Replacement Soils to Mitigate Earthquake Induced Ground Motions
AM Abdelhaleem, RM El-Sherbiny, H Lotfy… – Proc. 18th ICSMGE, 2013
… “ Earthquake Protection by Tire-Soil Mixtures: Numerical Study,” New Zealand Society
for Earthquake Engineering Conference Proceedings, Christchurch, New Zealand,
April. Zornberg, JG, Cabral, AR, and Viratjandr, C. (2004). …

The acoustical design of the Christchurch Town Hall                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      H Marshall – International Symposium on Room Acoustics, 2013 … All that changed on February 22, 2011. The second earthquake destroyed the heart of Christchurch. The Town Hall building was damaged but is reparable; indeed the City Council has unanimously agreed to restore it in its entirety. Page 7. 7 …

Health

Psychological outcomes for adolescents after the Canterbury earthquakes: posttraumatic stress, resilience and related factors: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of …
T Heetkamp – 2013
… schools in Christchurch 6 months after the most destructive earthquake. A quantitative …
The earthquake had an immense impact on the infrastructure of Christchurch. Much of
the city was without power and water directly after the impact, and a …

Smoking Prevalence Increases Following Canterbury Earthquakes
N Erskine, V Daley, S Stevenson, B Rhodes, L Beckert…
… Prior to the Christchurch Earthquake, 409 (41%) participant were never smokers, 316 (32%) we
re ex smokers and 273 (27%) were current smokers. … Page 15. Legend Figure 2 Prior to the
Christchurch Earthquake, 409 (41%) participant were never smokers, 316 (32%) were ex …

‘But I do believe you’ve got to accept that that’s what life’s about’: older adults living in New Zealand talk about their experiences of loss and bereavement support
G Bellamy, M Gott, S Waterworth, C McLean, N Kerse – Health & social care in the …, 2013
… earthquakes. The first caused extensive damage to the city of Christchurch on the
South Island where minor injuries, but no fatalities, were reported. Six months later,
a second earthquake hit the same city killing 185 people. …

Engineering

Empirical Selection Equation for Friction Pendulum Seismic Isolation Bearings Applied to Multi-Story Woodframe Buildings 1
JW van de Lindt, Y Jiang – Practice Periodical on Structural Design and …, 2013
… 5 2010 Darfield Earthquake and the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Gavin et al., 2012), as well
as a 14-story RC condominium building in Sendai (Nishiyama et al., 2011) and a 21 story … 4 2010
Darfield earthquake and the Feb. 22 2011 Christchurch earthquake”, Proc. 20th …

Hysteresis behavior of bracket connection in cross-laminated-timber shear walls
YL Shen, J Schneider, S Tesfamariam, SF Stiemer… – Construction and Building …, 2013
… accounts for stiffness and strength degradation under cyclic loading. Mitra [34]
developed the Code in OpenSees and applied it to a beam-column joint model for
simulating the earthquake response of reinforced concrete frames. …

A ‘HYBRID’MULTI-STOREY BUILDING–MEETING DESIGN CRITERIA IN A COST-EFFECTIVE WAY
S John, A Irving, G McDonnell, AH Buchanan
… in late 2011 within the known constraints of the site and Christchurch City Council rules and
regulations.* Of over-riding importance was that the building must provide damage-resistant
structural design technology, aimed at minimising any future earthquake damage (with the …

Analysis and Strengthening of Timber Floors and Roofs
JM Branco, R Tomasi – Structural Rehabilitation of Old Buildings, 2014
… The poor earthquake-performance of URM buildings has been widely rec- ognized for decades:
the recent Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand (22nd February 2011) that severely damaged
the URM buildings and killed more than 150 people, demonstrated once more …

Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: a system dynamics approach
H Kachali – 2013
… I came to Christchurch, a few days before the 4 September 2010 earthquake, with a general
idea of what my research would be. That changed on 4th September 2010 at 4: 35am when
greater Christchurch had the first in a series of earthquakes of MW 7.1. …

Collapse assessment of concrete buildings: an application to non-ductile reinforced concrete moment frames
M Baradaran Shoraka – 2013
… 226 Page 10. List of Figures x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1-1 Totally collapsed concrete
building in the M 6.3 Christchurch earthquake (Photo: KJ Elwood) …. 2 …

An Analysis of Bridge Abutment Shear Key Behavior due to Embankment Modeling and Earthquake Intensity
NM Wasef
… DE – Design Earthquake MAOC – Massachusetts Avenue Overcrossing NZ002 – Christchurch,
New Zealand Earthquake Motion, 2011 (See Table 3-1) SDC – Seismic Design Criteria (Caltrans,
2010) P0927 – Northridge Earthquake Motion, 1994 (See Table 3-1) …

Seismic behavior of a type of welded precast concrete beam-column connection
ME RodrÝguez, M Torres-Matos – PCI journal, 2013
… “Preview of PCI’s New Zealand Earthquake Reconnaissance Team Report.” PCI Journal 57
(1): 42–45. 6. Kam, WY, and S. Pampanin. 2011. “The Seismic Performance of RC Buildings
in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake.” Structural Concrete 12 (4): 223–233. …

Assessment of collapse capacity of RC buildings based on fiber-element modelling
M Ebrahami-Koopaee, RP Dhakal, BA Bradley… – 2013
… Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand. … Despite significant progress in development of structural models to simulate
structural collapse under earthquake loading, most of the research conducted so far has …

Lateral spreading-induced abutment rotation in the 2011 Christchurch earthquake: observations and analysis
JJM HASKELL, SPG MADABHUSHI, M CUBRINOVSKI… – 2013
A series of strong earthquakes near Christchurch, New Zealand, occurred between
September 2010 and December 2011, causing widespread liquefaction throughout the city’s
suburbs. Lateral spreading developed along the city’s Avon River, damaging many of the …

LYTTELTON PORT OF CHRISTCHURCH SEISMIC RESILIANCE FROM AN OWNERS PERSPECTIVE
G Chalmers, N McLennan, L Barsanti
… in the first years of life of the reinstated pavement. The annual probability of another
M6.3 earthquake in the Christchurch area is 8% at the current time. The pavement
construction varied throughout the terminal but in general …

A database for PGA threshold in liquefaction occurrence
F Santucci de Magistris, G Lanzano, G Forte… – … Dynamics and Earthquake …, 2013
… 14]; MC Quigley, S Bastin, BA Bradley; Recurrent liquefaction in Christchurch, New Zealand,
during the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Geology, 41 (2013), pp. 419–422. …

FRP Local Retrofit of Non-Conforming RC Beam-Column Joints
A Prota, M Di Ludovico, A Balsamo, C Moroni, M Dolce… – Seismic Evaluation and …, 2014
… Research report 95–4, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch.
LaFave JM, Kim J (2011) Joint shear behaviour prediction for RC beam … In: Proceedings of the
12th European conference on earthquake engineering, London, September 2002. …

 Seismic Behaviour of Reinforced Concrete Columns
J Liu – 2013
… mm (14 in.) diameter and 1473 mm (58 in.) length were tested under lateral cyclic
displacement excursions while simultaneously subjected to constant axial load
thus simulating earthquake loads. Eight columns were solely …

Non linear electromechanical cart characterization using minimal modeling approach
N Wongvanich, CE Hann, HR Sirisena
… For example, modal analysis is commonly used for assessing damage of a building after an
earthquake [3]. Another common approach is … Hann, HR Sirisena are with the Depart- ment of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. …

Avonside Holdings v Southern Response [2013] NZHC 1433 – Summary by Sarah

Background: this case considered a dispute in respect of  a rental property in Avondale, Christchurch, insured with AMI/Southern Response. Both the plaintiff and defendant agreed that the property was damaged beyond economic repair. The homeowner wished to buy another house and the maximum amount to be paid by the insurer was the cost of rebuilding the damaged house on the present site. The property owner had accepted an offer to sell their land to the Crown  so a new house would never actually be built on the site. The parties had agreed a figure between them, however there were differences between the two estimates.  Arrow International was the project manager appointed by the insurer. Because of the different approaches taken by the parties it was difficult to make comparison between the figures. After further discussion they narrowed their differences and what was left in dispute was  the value of the builder’s margin; contingency, professional fees, demolition costs and external works.

Builders Margin: was the sum to be calculated and determined to be the notional cost of rebuilding the house on the site. This was calculated by using estimated rates for each unit of work and accepting that on top of that figure,  a contractor would be likely to add a margin over its actual costs to allow for such matters as overhead costs not reflected in the unit rates, profit and other items.   MacKenzie J. found that this rate was likely to be 10%  on the assessed cost of the rebuild including  preliminary and general items.

He did not consider that a distinction should be made between preliminary items and other items in calculating the builder’s margin and that a large project management group such as Arrow with its ‘ability to negotiate special terms in Christchurch should not affect the true calculation of the cost of a notional rebuild’.

Contingencies: both parties agreed to use the definition in New Zealand Standards 4212, which contains a glossary of building terms in which defined contingency sums ‘are for items, the nature or extent of which cannot be defined otherwise in the contract documents. Such sums are wholly under the control of the architect, engineer or client’s representative administering the works and may be expended or deducted in part or in whole under his/her authority‘.

MacKenzie J. did not consider it appropriate to include a contingency allowance in calculating a notional rebuild cost and stated that there can by definition be no unexpected items as the house will never actually be built. Instead, what was required was the best assessment of the cost of rebuilding, based on all known circumstances.  In essence there is no need to add contingencies to reflect possible contingencies which will never be encountered.  So no allowance for contingencies was made for this ‘notional’ rebuild.

Professional Fees: this sum includes the fees which are likely to be incurred in professional services which are required in the designing of a replacement house, obtaining consents and supervising construction. The Judge considered that the amount to be calculated should reflect the ‘likely cost of those fees which will be necessarily incurred’. He did not consider that this should include other professional fees that the homeowner may choose to incur, making the distinction that not every home is architecturally designed. He noted that in some cases the insurance policy deals with some professional fees differently.  He awarded ”an appropriate estimate of the fees for items which would be necessarily incurred in the notional rebuild”.

Demolition Costs: The question arose as to whether the cost of demolishing a house should be allowed for a notional rebuild to allow for rebuilding on the site.

The property owner had accepted an offer to sell their land to the Crown  which meant that the property owner no longer has responsibility for demolition costs – and the policy obligations of insurers to demolish buildings would continue to be subject to discussion between CERA and insurers. Consequently demolition costs were not awarded by the Judge as the site was no longer in the ownership of the property owner.

The costs of a notional rebuild fix the maximum sum to be paid by the defendant towards the cost of buying another house.  Costs ‘must not be greater than rebuilding your rental house on its present site’.

External works: while both parties accepted that the house is a total loss they agreed that some of the external work items could be repaired or incorporated into a new house if it were  built to the same design on that site e.g. fences, walls and driveways.  The external works often form part of the insurance policy definition of  the property and are covered by the policy so that damage to those items is to be taken into account in deciding whether the house is damaged beyond economic repair – it must be assessed on a ‘global basis’ and an item by item assessment is not necessary.

However, if an owner chooses the cost of repairing external works which are repairable and reusable, then the cost of rebuilding the house on its present site can require an item by item assessment.  The Judge considered the appropriate analysis was that rebuilding the house could include incorporating into the rebuilt house external works which are capable of repair to an ‘as new condition’ and therefore the assessment of the cost of a notional rebuild can similarly take into account their possible reuse.

I think that this is a useful case for assisting with decisions concerning the reimbursement for ruined properties in the red zone and possibly beyond.

Quake Out-Casts go to the High Court – a Summary by Sarah

The Government was recently defeated in the High Court – a group called the Quake-Outcasts sought a judicial review of the Government’s compensation policy for red-zoned land. They called the offer an “abuse of power”. They alleged that the offer was “oppressive, disproportionate, contrary to their human rights and an abuse of power”. This abuse of power relates to contentious offers to buy red-zoned land from homeowners who were either uninsured or the owners of bare land (which is not covered by insurance).  It was stated that ”there are strong reasons for not extending an offer to these property categories on the same terms as for insured properties. It would compensate for uninsured damage, be unfair to other red zone property owners who have been paying insurance premiums, and it creates a moral hazard in that the incentives to insure in the future (where insurance is available) are potentially eroded.”

The group consisted of 46 land and home owners. The group has felt bullied by the government and were fighting for their right to self-determination of their own land, and full and fair compensation for appropriation of that land by the Government in the event that they were forced to give up their properties. At the time of the hearing 6,607 insured residential property owners received Crown offers, 72.79% accepted vacant land offers and 62.64% accepted uninsured residential property offers. The Judge, Graham Panckhurst  considers these to be ‘a fait accompli’, stating that this would indicate that the Crown offers were sufficient to allow those residents to recover from the earthquakes satisfactorily.

The Quake Outcasts asked the High Court to declare:
a) that the minister’s red zoning decision was unlawful;
b) declare that the 50% land – only Rateable Value buyout offer to only some red zoned property owners was unlawful;
c) make a declaration that those people who wish to remain should be able to and this should include being supported by essential facilities as permitted by law.

The History: On June 13 2011, there had been another major earthquake. A week later Cabinet authorised eight Ministers (including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Honourable Gerry Brownlee) to take decisions relating to land and remediation issues.

On 22 June 2011 they reached an agreement on the zoning of Christchurch and split the city into four zones, these decisions were jointly announced by the Prime Minster and Brownlee on the 23 June 2011.

The Government argued that the decisions taken by Brownlee and Sutton were lawful policy decisions made by Cabinet or by ministers acting under delegated Cabinet authority and therefore the statutory powers provided under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 did not need to be exercised, despite the fact that this piece of legislation binds the Crown and sets out a process of decision making which is to take place. Instead, the chief executive, Roger Sutton, developed a Recovery Strategy and a Recovery Plan and used these as the legitimization for their decision making.

The Human Rights Commission also made submissions on the basis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The use and enjoyment of one’s home is a fundamental human right – his Honour considered that the creation of the red zone interfered with that right.

The Issue: Red-zoned residential land is subject to a Crown offer to buy it at the 2007 rating valuation (RV) but uninsured or bare land owners are only being offered only 50% of that amount. Red zoning takes away from homeowners their right to live where they want without being interfered with; red zoning reduces their property values; red zoning takes away the open market for their properties (so they are unable to sell for market value if they wanted to). They experienced the National Government as forcing its low price offer on them taking away any right to full compensation for that land and property. In addition, the Government threatened to cut off all essential services (water, power, sewer, and roading) to their homes in the event that they did not accept the government offer.

His Honour, Judge Pankhurst considered three points:

“a) Does the creation of the red zone and the making of buy-out offers to property owners within the zone, affect property rights of the applicants?

b) Should decision(s) which resulted in the chief executive making 50 per cent offers to property owners in the red zone be set aside?

c) If so what form of relief is appropriate, if any.”

The Decision: The High Court decision from Justice Graham Panckhurst criticised both Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) chief executive Roger Sutton for their part in the issue. Justice Panckhurst said that the decision by Hon. Brownlee to make the Government offer was “not made according to law and is set aside as are the offers subsequently made to the applicants by [Sutton]”. He also directed Brownlee and Sutton to reconsider and “reach a new decision” to buy the properties.

He went on to say that financial considerations did not enable the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act to be brushed aside in favour of ‘decision-making by a group of Ministers on behalf of Cabinet.”

He declared “that the decision to create the red zone announced on 23 June 2011 did not lawfully affect the property rights of the property owner applicants in the proceeding…” but that the declaration is “limited to those who have successfully challenged the decision-making process”.

The Importance of This Case: At the heart of the case is the issue of private property ownership which is the legal foundation of society and our economy. Home ownership is one of the cornerstones which many New Zealanders have worked hard to achieve. There are genuinely times when government must take property in the conduct of managing services to citizens, but it must do so only when there is no other just alternative, and done to give everyone a fair deal.

It is very important that the taking of property by government should be open to public scrutiny and be subject to oversight. A chat between two members of Parliament and an unelected official  cannot be allowed as the basis for such important decision-making. Nor should a natural disaster be used as an excuse to discard the democratic process. Government and public officials must be held accountable by citizens from whom they derive their power, (and their pay!)..

So this success in the High Court should have far reaching and long lasting implications  It means that politicians will not be able to infringe on individual property rights so easily and the National Government will not be able to ‘get away with’ failure to pay full compensation when they ‘appropriate’ private property.

All New Zealanders should concern themselves with this case – Don’t you find it rather telling that this National Government, which has a tendency to increasingly override our rights and opinions when it chooses – is considering an appeal of this judgement? (See  http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/9094429/Walk-away-threat-offends-Outcasts).

If you want to check the condition of the democracy, watch the Courts, watch the Courts, watch the Courts……..